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In the forties the economic criteria of a bourgeois nation, which 
reflected both the demands for industrial development and the very pro­
cess of a political nation bourgeois transformations impulsed already by 
feudalism, came into the centre of attention. And the idea of the national 
state got an ever increasing importance in the liberal concept. Conse­
quently, the sharp differences of opinion between Széehenyi and the con­
servatives on the one hand, and the Opposition led by Kossuth on the 
other one were reflected in the national ideology as well.
The new economic components of the one Hungarian 
uniform political nation*
The Hungarian reformist nobility (gentry) led by Kossuth recogni­
zed the feudal barriers that hindered the development of industry and 
made a fair assessment of the tasks that could have resulted in the estab­
lishment of the independent Hungarian industry. “ . . . The foreign coun­
tries are thoroughly familiar with all these shortcomings — wrote Kossuth 
in one of his articles — Public opinion has very refined senses: those who 
possess the money, a lot of it that is required by our industrial enterprises 
may do something else or take to the road leading to such countries where 
they may find real security, decent position, and pleasant life regarding 
their person and possessions and not to such places where they are un­
protected and rightless. Factories and trade can flourish only with wise 
freedom, rights and a guaranteed protection.”
With Kossuth as Chairman, the objective of the establishment of 
the Hungarian Industrial Association in 1841 was the development of
U n d e r th e  te rm  “one  H u n g a rian  un ifo rm  p o litica l n a t io n ” we u n d e rs ta n d  th o se  
id eas o f  th e  H u n g a rian  n o b ili ty  w ho considered  th e  m ain  fe a tu re s  o f  a  n a tio n  to  b e  t h e  
h is to ric a l a n d  geograp h ica l fa c to rs  an d  n o t th o se  o f  th e  lan g u ag e  a n d  e th n ic a l o rig in .
H ence  as to  th e m  th e re  w as in  H u n g a ry  o n ly  o n e  H u n g a ria n  n a tio n , th e  n a tio n a l  
m in o ritie s  a s  th e  S lovaks, S erbs, R u m an ia n s  e tc . (excep t th e  C ro a ts) w ere co n sid ered  to  
b e  a  p a r t  o f  th e  H u n g a r ia n  n a tio n  who spoke  S lovak , S e rb ian , R u m a n ia n  e tc . lan g u ag es .
&*
industry. The Association launched the I leti lap (Weekly) in 1845 with 
the view of eliminating the misunderstandings about the concept of 
manufacturing industry and trade and offering reliabledata’ün thedimness 
of the selfknowledge of the nation,” the paper also wanted to present the 
industrial achievements to evoke sympathy towards “the humble 
merits of diligence and give directives to the utilization of the 
national treasures hitherto neglected.” There were clear perspectives 
before the struggle for the development of Hungarian industry; Kossuth 
knew that the establishment of a modern bourgeois nation was impos­
sible without industry: “Those who want to interpret the word «nation» 
in accordance with the exigencies of the 19th century cannot avoid the 
realization that it is no more a nation, but only a race, which does not 
possess the independent levers of civilization. Among these levers are 
inevitably the independent national trade and industry. Without these, 
there may be colonies and races in Europe but not nations. The Hun­
garians want to be a nation in the sense of the requirements of the 19th 
century.”1
The liberal Hungarian nobility was also aware that in the interest 
of bourgeois transformation the “supreme task” was the abolition of 
socage and the admittance of the people into the fold of the nation. “Do 
we believe — wrote Kossuth — that we can save the country by patch- 
work reforms ? Do we imagine that we can safeguard the future of our 
nation if we have missed laying the foundation stone of the structure of 
future ? And what else can this foundation be but the union with the 
people and, thus, the creation of a whole and healthy body of the nation, 
and how can we even dream about this until the separating wall of socage 
and breeding hatred is between us . . .  All of us are members of the people 
of the country, and if the state is not for the interest of the people, than 
I do not understand why it exists.’”2
Hungarian reform nobility was much concerned about problems of 
customs, trade and railway construction. When Vienna suggested the 
idea of accession to the German customs union, Kossuth pointed out 
in a series of articles how serious its consequences could be upon the 
economic life of Hungary.3
During the fight against the accession to the Zollverein, Kossuth 
clarified for himself many questions related to customs. Contrary to his 
earlier views, he realized that the establishment of Hungarian industry 
and national market was impossible without the struggle against the 
economic dependence on Austria and without the introduction of a sys­
tem of customs defence. “A nation — wrote Kossuth — which may not 
itself define its laws and administer its economy according to its own 
interest is not a farmer but a farm, not a eellarman but a tub; in other 
words, it is not a nation.”4
The conservatives, representing the Hungarian landlords were against 
the demand for a system of customs defence and stood for a common 
customs territory with Austria. In the cross-firing of the heated debates 
stood Kossuth, who expounded his opinion in articles published in the
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lletilap. Against the view maintained by the Budapest! Ilirado (Budapest 
Courier), the paper of the conservatives according to whom the customs 
border between Hungary and Austria should be abolished, he explained 
that the country could only accept a customs settlement that guaranteed 
free trade with all foreign countries, “or protect the market of our 
country against the oppressive competition of the monopolistic industry 
of Austria.”3
Thus, the reformer Opposition did not want to do away with the 
customs barrier between Austria and Hungary, but they only wanted 
to alter it to the benefit of the country. Kossuth had also refuted the 
argument of the Budapest! Ilirado that the establishment of the system 
of customs defence is “fanciful idealism” and the abolition of the customs 
barrier is a “practical idea”.6
The plan of railways was closely related to these questions, and 
when it was raised, the Hungarian gentry found themselves confronted 
with the Croatian bourgeois elements and not with the Austrian bourgeoi­
sie. The Hungarian reform nobility considered the building of the Pest — 
Vukovâr — Fiume railway line of pressing importance. The aim of this 
line was to secure the overseas export of cereals grown in Hungary. 
Thus, the task served one of the vital and objective criteria of the deve­
lopment of the bourgeois nation, i.e. the establishment of economic unity 
and national market, and consequently paved the way of bourgeois 
progress. But this significant economic demand had seriously affected 
the most advanced national minority of Hungary, the Croatians, who 
alike turned against the economic unity of a multi-national state that 
was about to evolve under Hungarian leadership. The only national 
confrontation of the period of an economic nature that indicated that 
the Croatian bourgeois elements wanted to create an independent Croatian 
national market developed in relationship with the plans of railway 
construction.7 Similar objectives among the other national minorities 
can be observed only later, during the period of the dual monarchy.
The facts mentioned above prove that the Hungarian liberal nobility 
had recognized the main criterion of the development of the bourgeois 
nation, i.e. the necessity for the establishment of the national market 
and economic unity. But this significant national idea could gain ground 
only by a hard ideological struggle in two directions, partly against the 
Austrian bourgeoisie and partly against the non-Hungarians, primarily 
the rising Croatian bourgeois layers. This struggle also manifests the dual 
nature, the progressive and the regressive aspects of Hungarian nationa­
lism.
The economic elements represented a new colour in the concept 
of a one Hungarian uniform political nation and they particularly ref­
lected its degree of bourgeois development . In other words, with the de­
velopment of capitalist conditions an economic unity covering the whole 
of Hungary and a market common for all the peoples living in the country 
were about to take shape. The appearance of the outlines of a market 
common for the Hungarian and non-Hungarian inhabitants of the land
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had strengthened the policy of the nationalities of the Hungarian gentry 
that hindered the national development of the non-Hungarian peoples 
of the country and blocked the further progress of their national mo­
vements. The gentry, aiming at the establishment of a Hungarian bour­
geois state, considered multi-national Hungary to be its “national” 
market and wanted to align the strength of the whole country, including 
the nationalities, with a developing national movement against Austrian 
oppression. But the Hungarian nobility tried to achieve its objective 
by the amalgamation and assimilation of the national minorities and 
not by winning them over to the cause; they pursued a policy towards 
the nationalities that had identified the concept of the nation with that 
of the state. The basic principle was that “the nation is the same as the 
state, which can he created only by history.” Accordingly a nation may 
consist of several nationalities, and these may demand their place within 
the state “not above the state, nor contrary to the interests of the state.” 
Consequently, the nationalities are also within the framework of the state 
of the Hungarian nation, and their objectives should conflict with the 
interests of the Hungarian state.
A series of articles were published supporting this ideology using 
arguments similar to those described above. The nation of this land - 
wrote the periodical Szâzadunk (Our Century) — consists of various 
elements only linguistically; during the course of centuries, however it 
has become one nation having common institutions and benefits and 
sharing a common destiny by the most suited element, which is un­
doubtedly de jure et de facto the Hungarian.. . And if this amalgama­
tion. this unity, which is the precondition of the future greatness of Hun­
gary, has not yet become a reality because of the folly of circumstances; 
no one can say that it would not take shapes and that the means employed 
for the achievement of the objective represent a barbarous system.’8
The ideology of ’’one nation”, ’’one state” was supported on behalf of 
the liberal nobility who emphasized the ideas of the foundation of the 
state and the glorious past. In the meantime one of their arguments was 
that the nationalities did not have a free past and independent state; 
consequently, they did not constitute a nation, and their objectives 
had no ground and were against the Hungarian nation. Thus, Hungarian 
nobility regarded the majority of the non-Hungarian nations incapable 
of creating an independent state, treated them accordingly, and denied 
national equality arguing that they lacked historical background.9
The idea that the few thousand militant Hungarians of the time of 
the Conquest could not populate the whole country and, therefore, wel­
comed foreigners later on as well belonged to the above concept. The 
foreign peoples, i.e. their nobility, were even granted “constitutional 
freedom”. According to the arguments it was a mistake that the freedom 
granted was not subordinated to certain conditions, and in this respect, 
as indicated by the liberal Erdélyi Hîradô (Transylvanian Courier), “we 
cannot deny the negligence and overwhelming politesse of our ancestors. 
Indeed, how many thousand Wallackian families who still stick to their
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Wallachian nationality and want to share the Hungarian privileges but 
not the knowledge of our language were uplifted by our Kings and 
monarchs to a privileged estate in the nation; whereas, we Hungarians 
negligently watch them with crossed arms and haven’t  even tried to 
limit the deterioration by them of our own Hungarian blood, which may 
be experienced occasionally.”10 Thus, the theory of “accepting” the natio­
nalities, i.e. feudalistic interpretation of historical rights, was closely 
intertwined with the modern bourgeois demands of the forties. This am­
biguous ideology is explained, not only by the peculiar situation of the 
Hungarian gentry (oppressing and being oppressed all at the same time), 
but also by their feudal class interests though they stood for bourgeois 
development.
The identification of the nation with the state was closely linked to 
the unrealistically optimistic view held by the Hungarian liberal nobi­
lity that, if the oppressed national minorities were given civil rigths, 
the whole question of nationalities would be solved once and for all with­
out the creation of equality among the nationalities. “We strongly 
hoped — wrote Ferenc Pulszky in his memoirs as Opposition politician — 
that general freedom and the elimination of feudal bonds would termi­
nate the agitation of the nationalities among the Protestant Slovaks, as 
well as among the Croatians and Rumanians belonging to the Eastern 
Church”.11
This acceptance differs from the tolerant ideas of the early 19th 
century that rejected subjugation (the concept of Jözsef Reviczky, etc.).,]/<l 
The concept of the forties, as proven by the subsequent events, was 
wrong, but due to its democratic content, it could secure the support of 
some sections of the masses of national minorities in 1848 — 49.
The intolerance and pessimism of Szechenyi and the conservatives
The tolerance as to the question of nationalities by Szechenyi and 
his moderate followers and also by the conservatives in the forties is 
well known in our historical literature. Opposite views, nevertheless 
may also be observed during the same period. In order to understand 
the obviously contradictory concept taking shape in the conflict of na­
tionalities and classes, I have to point out a law that 1 have already dealt 
with in several of my works.
It is a well-known fact that the Opposition, led by Kossuth, had 
waged a bitter fight against the Austrian influence, and this struggle 
was closely linked to the modes of the involvence of the masses which 
were more liberal than in the thirties. Differing from it, Szechenyi and 
his followers, not to mention the conservatives, wanted to moderate the 
national struggle by all means, because they saw that the policy of the 
Opposition may lead to inevitable clashes and even a breach with Aust­
ria; whereas, they wanted to maintain good terms with the Empire. In 
the meantime Szechenyi kept up his earlier liberal views concerning the 
involvence of the masses, but he did not go any further in the forties 
either. This was also one of the causes of the conflicts evolving between
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him and Kossuth and his group. All this suggested a policy of tolerance 
towards the national minorities. In this regard, Széchenyi expounded 
his views most characteristically in his famous speech delivered at the 
Academy of Sciences in 1842.
Thus, Széchenyi and those who were close to him had apparently 
more progressive views about the question of the nationalities than 
Kossuth and the Opposition. And if we stress that Széchenyi’s tolerance 
towards the non-Hungarian peoples was objectivly more progressive 
than the policy of the Opposition, which cannot be underestimated from 
the point of view of improving the relationships with the nationalities, 
we should make it also clear that Széchenyi’s general views were no more 
progressive than those of the Opposition, but they were lagging behind 
them in social as well as national questions. The Opposition wanted to eli­
minate feudalism and wanted to safeguard bourgeois development 
more consistently than Széchenyi. And it was a well-known fact that 
the progress of national movements and the deepening of the contrast 
between the nationalities were all closely linked with bourgeois develop­
ment or with its demand. As compared to the general approach of the 
nobility, Széchenyi had taken a significant step foreward in demanding 
bourgeois development, but he could not go so far as the Opposition. 
Consequently his tolerance was neither more advanced nor progressive, 
but it was the result of his less consistent concept of the abolition of the 
feudal system (but far more progressive if compared to the feudal views) 
than that of the Opposition. It should be added that Széchenyi and his 
followers did not only lag behind Kossuth and the Opposition in the 
question of bourgeois transformation, but their Hungarian national 
programme, closely connected with the former one, could not reach so far 
either.
Thus it is understandable that those who were more modest in 
their Hungarian national objectives similarly towards their bourgeois 
demands, pursued a more tolerant policy towards the non-Hungarian 
peoples as well. And this holds true for the reverse too: those who con­
ducted a more consistent struggle for the Hungarian independence, such 
as Kossuth and even more, the Radicals had a less tolerant policy towards 
the nationalities. The contradiction was a necessary consequence of the 
nationalism of the age. Those who expected a more progressive policy 
from Kossuth and the Radicals than from the more moderate Széchenyi 
and similar politicians in the forties, are wrong.
The conservatives and the most regressive stratum of Hungarian 
nobility, the aristocrats loyal to the dynasty and serving the Austrian 
Court with zeal, had advocated a policy of the nationalities that was even 
more tolerant than that of Széchenyi. Their tolerance was serving clearly 
visible political objectives. The loyal nobility wanted to preserve Latin 
as the official language. Metternich had a similar kind of tolerance to­
wards the nationalities. The major motive of this tolerance was to leave 
everything as it had been to maintain the rule of Austrian absolutism and 
feudal system. And, if we have surveyed the right wing to its extreme
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point, the connection revealed also throws light on the motive of the 
“understanding” policy of the Austrian government p u r s u e d  towards the 
non-Hungarian people; i.e. that the support of the national movements 
of non-Hungarians promised favourable opportunities of counter-balanc­
ing the Hungarian national demands and the bourgeois transformation 
intertwined with them.12
Having mentioned these circumstances in advance, we may turn 
now to the presentation of the optimism of the liberal Opposition and. 
in this connection, to the introduction of the concept held by Széchenyi 
and his moderate followers and further on, the loyal nobility and the 
conservatives. These views were expressed in relation to several important 
questions of bourgeois transformation, such as the entailment and the 
right to possession linked to it. settlements allocated by landlords, and 
the introduction of bourgeois institutions. In these matters, contrary to 
the earlier ones, Széchenyi and the loyal nobles represented the less tolerant 
view of the nation. Vet, if we penetrate into the matter, we may discover 
that all this was related to their general political principles: i.e. the 
protection of the Hungarian nation was only a pretext to assert the in­
terests of the nobility. Differing from them, the Opposition, which was 
struggling more consistently for the bourgeois transformation, turned 
against the false advertisement of the Hungarian national interests and 
enthusiastic of their progressive bourgeois objectives, was optimistic 
in believing that the Hungarian nation would widely gain ground.
The abolition of entailment was first raised by Istvân Széchenyi 
in his work Stadium (Stage). “Whatever property ... that is sold for 
good by somebody with the consent of the parties concerned cannot ever 
be taken back under any pretext by the seller or his progeny from the 
purchaser or his descendants: the sale for good can never be undone.” 
This concept of Széchenyi did not restrict the right to possession accord­
ing to which the land of nobles could be bought by anybody. Later, 
however, Széchenyi had expressed the idea of the “preservation of the 
nation,” which limited the right to possession to some extent.13
This view was represented by the paper Jelenkor (Contemporary 
Age), which was close to Széchenyi and turned against the opinion of the 
loyal nobility as well as against that of the Opposition. The loyal nobles, 
pretending to be the champions of the national cause, did not feel a- 
shamed to state that “the nation has been and is preserved by entailment.” 
The columnist of Jelenkor was right in saying that “entailment does not 
preserve but lulls the nation,” and he proved convincingly that the mas­
ses had preserved the nation: “he poor people who could only rely on 
their own helpless humanity and are left mainly outside the trenches of 
the constitution; have been serving their lecherous masters and keeping 
the interests of the nation on their bosom with bloody sweat. In the mean­
time, the author of the article in Jelenkor. contrary to the views of the 
Opposition and corresponding to those of Széchenyi, wanted to restrict 
considerably the right to possession: “nobody in this country who is not 
Hungarian should be permitted to possess a foot’s length of land before
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becoming, by means to be elaborated, Hungarian legally and linguisti­
cally and being admitted in to the bosom of the Hungarian nation.”11 
According to this view, those persons whose mother tongue wasn’t Hun­
garian could not have a bourgeois land possession.
On the other hand, the Opposition did not want to employ any 
restrictions. It was expounded in the Pesti Hirlap that “the shift of the 
real estates of Hungarian nobles to foreign hands by individual sales does 
not endanger our nation, as such a purchaser himself and by all means 
his first successor would be assimilated to the other possessors.” And the 
Opposition did not see any danger in grafting “a little German industry' 
into the Hungarian trunk.” Thus the Opposition was optimistic even in 
the matter of Magyarization, contrary to Jelenkor, which did not trust 
assimilation very much. “There are no doubt some examples, perhaps 
in Tolna county’ and elsewhere — says the paper — that Hungarians 
were victorious, but there are many more regions where, in the previous 
century, foreign spirit and language had spread all over, and the only- 
indication, that earlier inhabitants used to be Hungarians are the name 
of the inhabitants and the settlements. Thus, we cannot expect anything 
from assimilation.”15
Jelenkor had kept this question on its agenda later on as well, refut­
ing the views of the loyal nobility as well as those of the Opposition. 
The paper also published a proposal according to which landed property 
may be obtained without political rights by people who had been resi­
dents in the country for ten years and had pursued trade or industry. 
Landed property- with political rights was to be accessible only to those 
who knew the Hungarian language “properly in speech and moreover, in 
writing and reading.” But a subsequent issue of the paper returned to 
the earlier view, and a sharp debate followed this detail of the question.1*
After having surveyed the different views, let us analyse the cause 
of the apparent contradiction; i.e. that the loyal nobles and Széchenyi. 
together with the nobles close to them, had represented a less tolerant 
nationalism in this question; whereas, the Opposition was more tolerant.
The opinion of the loyal aristocrats is clear: they wanted to maintain 
feudal entail ment and utilize it as an efficient argument in support of the 
idea of the “protection of the nation.” Széchenyi and his followers also 
wanted to protect landed property against the bourgeoisie, because the 
essence of restriction according to nationality was that the local bourgeoi­
sie, which was almost exclusively of German or Jewish origin and hardly 
spoke Hungarian, could not possess land. The similarity (the protection 
of the privileges of the nobles) between the views of the loyal nobility and 
Széchenyi and his followers can be observed along with the differences 
also.
The well-known optimism of the Opposition was only increased 
by the fact that a considerable part of the German and Jewish bourgeoisie 
supported the Opposition; its development — likewise, the reform nobi­
lity — , was hindered by the Austrian economic policy weighing heavily 
on the country.17 Under the circumstances, the German and Jewish
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bourgeoisie were allies of the Hungarian Opposition, but they were also 
against the restrictions suggested by the Jelenkov and Széchenyi for 
nationalities in the sense of the bourgeois liberal demands of the gentry.
Similar trends were expressed in the debate on the question of se tt­
lements between the Jelenkov and the Pesti Ilivlap. The former suggested 
that if the landlords cannot get Hungarian settlers to their farms, it was 
better to leave their estates unpopulated. “We do not consider advisable 
the settlement of our non-Hungarian fellow citizens: though the settle­
ment grows laige and strong quickly and the region from where they have 
come is filled soon by those who have remained there, . . . the population 
of the Slovak colonies, which turn Hungarian with great difficulties, 
has already grown at least ten times and has already issued new branches, 
i. e. it has produces new Slovak villages. We have quite a lot of trouble 
with them, so we should not bother the foreigners: they should remain in 
their own country with their own nationality, and we should try  to teach 
Hungarian to the sons of our own country only.”
The view of the Opposition was expounded by Istvân Bezerédy, a 
gentry from Tolna, one of the leaders of the Opposition. He agreed with 
the proposals that in accordance with the possibilities the Hungarian 
peasants should be settled on the uncultivated lands, but he also raised the 
question as to whether it is more important for the Hungarian nation to 
leave the land barren or “to let it be populated by such inhabitants of our 
country who, under their present conditions, have not become Hungarians 
or by foreigners, who can hardly become Hungarians outside our country?” 
The answer was obvious: “the settlement of non-Hungarians is closer to 
that of the Hungarians than the deserted wilderness and lifeless lands . . . 
The cultivation of the land of the country, its fertile, lovely, flourishing 
sight, industry with its thousand faces, transport that brings profit, 
progress and security, and all that derived and related to these are enor­
mous factors in regard to the nation as well, and wherever they are 
lacking or stagnate, the matter of the nation also suffers the conse­
quences.” Thus, the settlement of population, even of peasants of the 
national minorities in the waste lands was one of the important demands 
of bourgeois national development.18 In the matter of the Magyarization 
of non-Hungarian settlers, the author of the article repeatedly ex­
pressed the familiar optimism; i. e. the Hungarian bourgeois development 
and liberal system would guarantee the most complete assimilation.
As far as the adoption of modern bourgeois institutions in Hungary 
was concerned, the loyal nobles advocated with a false nationalism that 
the feudal institutions should not be abolished; particularly serfdom 
should be maintained, for in their view, its elimination would mean the 
absorption of the Hungarian elements that are in minority. Count Aurel 
Dessewffy, criticizing a pamphlet of the liberal Karolv Zay who advocated 
Magyarization, attacked the view, among others, that Zay had identified 
the Hungarian nation, the spread of Hungarian nationalization, and 
Magyarization with democratic rights. When the Opposition fought for 
the introduction of popular representation, the loyal aristocrats argued
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in the following manner: “Do not base the future of Hungary on popular 
representation, — said Pal Somsich, delegate of County Somogy at the 
last Diet of the Estates — because by it, you would unwillingly provoke 
the struggle of the nationalities: it praises the wisdom of our ancestors 
that they had established the representation of authority in a polyglot 
country; do stick to that which, extended to the royal and larger market- 
towns, guarantees the superiority of the Hungarians for centuries; other­
wise, though you may not he endangered yet, you will he exposed to 
constant attacks by the various nationalities.”
The conservative Budapesti Hırada represented the characteristic 
opinion. It expounded the following in one of its articles: “In Hungary 
there is a cardinal point: it is nationality which decides the maximum in 
the granting of civil rights.” On this basis the paper had sharply criticised 
the Opposition headed by Kossuth, who wanted to introduce civil rights 
to the detriment of the Hungarian national interests.18 Here again we may 
witness the phenomenon of the representatives of reaction branding the 
supporters of progress as unpatriotic.
Kossuth had given a suitable answer to the pseudo-patriotic dema­
gogy of the loyal aristocrats and expressed the democratic nature of the 
policy towards the nationalities of the Hungarian gentry. “1. The j're,edam 
of the press is not wanted, — wrote Kossuth summing up the view of the 
loyal nobility — because a stratum of intellectuals might develop among 
the non-Hungarian elements. 2. Jury is not wanted, beacuse non-Hunga­
rians would participate in meting out justice with Hungarians. 3. General 
representation is not wanted, beacuse it would bring to political maturity 
the non-Hungarians as well. 4. Manumission compensation by national 
effort is not wanted, for it would emancipate the non-Hungarians as veil, 
and all these would endanger the nation. In other words, . . .  a gap as 
wide as possible should be created between the five million Hungarians 
and the ten million non-Hungarians; this is going to be the only means 
for the extension, or at least the maintenance of our nation.” These ideas 
were strongly denounced by Kossuth on behalf of the Opposition and he 
was right to state about this policy that it was equal “to dooming the 
foreign elements living in Hungary to the fate of the Virginian blacks,” 
and that “this is the political theory the price of which was dearly paid 
by Great Britain in Ireland”.20 Though this concept of Kossuth anti his 
followers was pointing to the future, it still could not be neglected that the 
granting of democratic rights was rather insufficient, for the non- 
Hungarian peoples wanted more; they demanded collective national 
rights.
The questions discussed here prove th a t the concept of the Opposi­
tion and of Széehenyi should be analysed jointly if eve want to  see the 
relationships between the bourgeois and the national elements expressed 
by them  and if we want to  dissolve the  apparen t contradictions. In rela­
tion to  the debate abou t the la tte r question we m ust differentiate between 
Széehenyi and the loyal aristocrats; it should not be neglected, though 
th a t Széehenyi’s views were between those of the  liberal Opposition and
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the loyal nobility, and the deviations were due to his programme of 
bourgeois transformation, which was less consistent if compared to the 
first and more definite if compared to the second. The difference from the 
loyal opinion indicated that Széchenyi and his followers had taken serious 
steps towards the abolition of feudalism, though not to the same extent 
as was done by the Opposition. It should be noted here that Széchenyi 
and his group, due to the nature of their concept, were more afraid of the 
peasants, particularly of the non-Hungarian serfs, than of the Opposition, 
because they had taken into account the possibility of the non-Hungarian 
peasant movements being joined to the national movement, which might 
lead to the deepening of the national question, the moderation of which 
was one of the basic element of their policy.
Thus the progressive idea, which means the linking of advancem ent 
and nationalism  and was prim arily advocated by Széchenyi in the  th irties, 
was taken over by the liberal Opposition; thus th ey  became the pro tago­
nists of the ideology which was first expressed by Széchenyi.
Summing up, the loyal aristocrats strongly attacked the most positive 
element of the objectives of the Opposition, the liberalism of their policy 
towards the nationalities and their efforts to grant rights to the national 
minorities; the loyal nobility wanted to exclude the masses of Hungarians 
and non-Hungarians from the democratic rights by emphasizing patrio­
tism. Their “patriotic concern” covered a chauvinistic opinion, and the 
“protectors” of the Hungarian nation and the non-Hungarian peoples 
were nothing more than the most faithful pillars of the Austrian govern­
ment.
We believe that the views expressed here give an answer to the argu­
ments of Domokos Kosâry that challenged the law 1 expounded earlier.21 
Kosâry, when criticizing my concept, started by saying that historical 
phenomena developed through contradictions and not linearly” as 
it is in the case of a mathematical progression.” Thus, he stressed, even if 
there was some truth in it that the politician struggling more consistently 
for bourgeois transformation could have followed less tolerant principles, 
it still cannot be accepted; indeed, Count Jözsef Dessewffy, who was 
further away from bourgeois objectives and closer to feudalism than 
Széchenyi, still was of an intransigent view in 1825 on the national ques­
tion; I also quoted this opinion in one of my earlier papers. This sole 
reference cannot be convincing in itself if we take into account the series 
of facts recently revealed and discussed here.22
The example of Dessewffy cannot be accepted because of a number 
of other important reasons. The Count had actively participated in the 
elaboration of the Hungarian national ideology in the early 19th century, 
and his later debate with Széchenyi also indicates that he had placed in the 
foreground the national elements, partly trying to divert attention from 
the internal class struggle. His activities may be compared to the move­
ment of the nobility in 1790 and to the nationalism of the nobility in the 
twenties and thirties of the 19th century; here also Dessewffy, differed from 
the loyal aristocrats of the forties. On the other hand, the aristocrats of
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the  twenties did not generally follow the  way of Dessewffy, bu t tu rned  
their back to  their nation; they  were not nationalists (not even feudal 
national!), but if we m ay use the term , they  were cosmopolitans, “ un- 
national“ , and they  did not require a  national phraseology in asserting 
their political interests. Thus, the loyal nobility of the twenties and 
th irties, as proved by the above analysis, differed from the  aristocrats of 
the  forties in th is respect as well. The reasons may be found in the chang­
ing conditions.
My concept described here refers to the forties, and all my data are 
taken from those years; it is only too natural that these connexions are 
valid only for that decade. The sequence of events, i. e. of chronology, has 
a commonly accepted prominent role, and it requires no special verifica­
tion that, while conflicts between the nationalities only appeared in the 
twenties, they had become quite sharp by the forties. And this pheno­
menon had primarily defined the policy of the loyal aristocrats that, in 
accordance with the views of the Court, had supported the movements 
of the national minorities against the strongest national-bourgeois trend 
of the Empire, i. e. against the Hungarian Opposition. In the meantime, 
it should not be forgotten either that the Hungarian Reform Movement 
only began after 1825 and developed in the forties; the Opposition was 
formed at that time, and only then did the Hungarian national movement 
become truly dangerous for Austrian absolutism. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that just in the national question the opinion of the loyal 
aristocrats went through a fundamental change when compared to that 
of the twenties.
These are the basic differences between Jozsef Dessewffy and his 
son Aurél. I mention it because Kosâry reasonably chose the words 
of Jdzsef Dessewffy expressed in 1825; in this manner he used the 
example of the well-known loyal family of the forties, one which could 
hardly be suited of the refutation of a characteristic context of the for­
ties.
Another problem of K osâry 's criticism is th a t, differing from my 
approach, he isolated the problem of internal transform ation within 
the concept of Széchenyi separating from it the national question, the 
m atter of the relationship with Austria, even though in the concept 
itself, bourgeois development and national demands were closely linked 
with each o ther.23
The Slav question and Hungarian nationalism
The fear of the cooperation among Slav peoples had obtained a prom i­
nent place in the H ungarian national ideology. The joining of forces, by 
the related nationalities left to  themselves and facing similar tasks was 
only natural and  a necessary phenomenon. The liberal Opposition was 
more afraid  of th is cooperation than  the  conservatives; thus, the problem 
belongs to  the subject of our analysis.
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I t  is only too natural th a t the liberal Hungarian gentry, the  national 
movement of which was intertw ined with the struggle for civil rights, 
w atched with great anxiety  the great Slav power, the  despotic Tsarist 
Russia, the  “nothern  colossus.” They not only believed she was behind 
every Slav dem and, bu t they also believed she actually  directed all th e  
steps of these nationalities. Here we cannot study  in detail th e  com plicated 
(juestions of Slav m utuality  and Pan-Slavism and the often contradictory  
variants of Slav thought, because we have dealt with them  earlier in 
several places.24 Now we would only like to  direct a tten tion  to those con­
nections th a t are relevant to  our subject.
The various views of the opposition were brilliantly summarized 
by Miklôs Wesselényi in his work Szôzat a magyar és szlâv nemzetiség 
ïujyében (Appeal on the Cause of the Hungarian and the Slav Nation), 
published in 1843. Here again, the idea of this work is that “danger 
threatens you, my country, danger that has never been.” Based on his­
torical rights containing feudal elements as well, Wesselényi saw the 
cause of danger in the ancestors not granting rights to the subjugated 
peoples and to the Hungarians not having privileges a t the time of the 
Conquest. This danger had become more threatening as the various peo­
ples began to have constitutional and national demands. The national 
objectives of the Slavs were made use of by the Tsarist Russian “propa­
ganda”. This propaganda was successfully pursued in countries with 
Slav population, excepting Poland. “In this manner, he (i.e. the Tsar — 
E. A.) acquired relationships concerning the countries, such that a mighty 
power can have on the castles of an other mighty power such a great party 
among the people of those castles who are ready to surrender the castle 
or to put to the sword the defending army and its commanders, and for 
this deed, they wait only for the opportunity and the sign of that one”. 
In a more modern wording, it could be considered as a fifth column.
Wesselényi and the Hungarian public opinion could not realis­
tically assess the foreign political situation, and they exaggerated the 
possible danger the Empire of the Tsar represented, flic Tsarist Russia in 
the first part of the 19th century did not yet aim at “having a big party 
among the people of the castle” in Austria (and Hungary) which was an 
ally, and in Prussia and did not intend to crush the Austrian Monarchy 
and, together with it, Hungary, by winning the Slavs in Hungary and 
Austria. Even though the leaders and participants of the Slav movements 
were sympathetic towards the Russian people and read the works of 
Russian literature with great enthusiasm and were in touch with the libe­
ral Russian politicians and the Russian Slavists who were close to Pan- 
Slavism, they weren’t  the agents of Tsarism, even though they might 
have cherished some illusions towards the foreign policy of the Tsarist 
Empire. All these offered sufficient ground for Hungarian public opinion 
to exaggerate, instead of to realistically survey, the endeavours of the 
Slavs for unity and cooperation and, particularly, the role of the Tsarist 
Russia in the Slav efforts. As a consequence, Wesselényi and the Hungar­
ian public opinion could not differentiate between the democratic and
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the  reactionary  Slav unity . And as a consequence of Slav nationalism , the 
Slavs regarded as their own all Slav unity , whether it was progressive or 
reactionary; sim ilarly, Wesselényi and H ungarian nationalism  summ arily 
condemned all kinds of Slav cooperation.
Thus, Wesselényi had expounded the views of the entire Opposition 
when he explained the possible role of Tsarist Russia in an eventual revo­
lutionary movem ent of the Slav peoples and the  advantages she would 
have, even in the case the m ovem ent had liberal objectives 
and  a course opposite to  the Tsarist Russian interests. This concern about 
the Slav movements resulted  in W esselényi’s opinion th a t it was necessary 
to  strengthen the non-Slavs, i.e. those nationalities who were against the 
T sarist Em pire, such as the  Rum anians and the  Eastern Church, by 
granting them  equality  with the others. In the mean tim e, starting  from 
th e  menace th a t he saw as threaten ing  H ungary, and as disadvantageous 
to  the  country, in the political, religious, and national disunity  of the 
people (i. e. the one H ungarian uniform political nation) and in the de­
mands of the nationalities, particularly  in these of the Slavs, Wesselényi 
also described the tasks th a t contained some of the positive elements 
of the  policy of the gentry  towards the nationalities. He suggested the 
fulfilm ent of the ju st demands of the Slavs and the necessity of consider - 
ation tow ards the Slavs. “In regard to  the Slavs, we should not only 
refrain from doing anything which is wrong, but we should do all th a t is 
righ t. Thus, the foremost of our tasks is to  recognize and fulfil those de­
mands of our Slav fellow-citizens th a t  are r ig h t.” But under Slavs, Wesse­
lényi mainly understood the Croatians, and he considered the demands of 
the other Slav nationalities less reasonable. He regarded the demand to 
use the  m other tongue in Croatia to  be a just one, bu t for the other na tiona­
lities, lie thought sufficient the safeguarding of civil rights without nation­
al concessions.
Wesselényi also indicated among others “the rise and extension” of 
the  Hungarian nation as an im portan t task. Under the definition, Wesse­
lényi partly  meant the  safeguarding of dem ocratic culture, the teaching 
of Hungarian language even in the kindergarden and  a t  school, and the 
bourgeois transform ation and “constitu tionality .” “Inhab itan ts of the 
country speaking different languages may constitute a well-built body 
despite  the separate languages, provided they  are closely linked to  one 
another by equal rights, duties, and interests. And the linguistic differen­
ces may disappear in the close contact and frequently and do disappear: 
whatever is closely knit civilly usually gets am algam ated na tio n a lly  as 
well.” In this m anner, the granting of dem ocratic rights (without the 
equality  of the  nationalities), the creation of a liberal Hungary, and  the 
M agvarization of the national m inorities got intertw ined in th is m anner 
in the policy of the Opposition towards the nationalities. In the develop­
ment of these views, German liberalism also had an im portant role. The 
German liberals, con trary  to  Herder, regarded the establishm ent of a 
national s ta te  im portan t and possible. They did not even exclude the 
possibility  of some languages elim inating the language of other national
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m inorities, and thus, two “m ajor na tions,” the German and the  H unga­
rian, would emerge th a t could stop  the expansion of Tsarist Russia along 
the river Danube. Thus, the outlines of a H ungarian-G erm an alliance 
began to  take shape against Pan-Slavism.
The m ature liberal ideas naturally  could not guarantee the achieve­
ment of the im portant objective also indicated by Wesselényi, i.e. the 
tru st of the Slavs. Moreover, Wesselényi, due to 'h is  fear of the Slavs, 
advocated the idea of a “close a ttachm ent to  and  a close alliance with the 
governm ent” of Vienna and emphasized th a t, if during “the course of our 
history we did not p u t on the throne the imperial offspring of the H abs­
burg Counts, it would now be high tim e to  do i t .”25
In the national question, the centralists held views practically  sim i­
lar to  those of the Opposition. If  there was any  difference at a ll , 'i t  was 
due to  the fact tha t the centralists* were more afraid  of the national 
minorities, particularly  of the Slavs, than  they  were of K ossuth and  his 
followers; thus, they more definitely  supported the m aintenance of the 
Austrian Empire. The consequence of this view was th a t the centralists 
wanted to  rely upon Vienna much more against ’’Pan-Slavism ” than  the 
( )p posit ion.26
I he san 6 orientation may be noted with several prom inent represent- 
a tiv is  of the Opposition. In fact, when the H ungarian liberal nobility 
fought against the Viennese Court for the independence of the country, 
they also approached the  A ustrian Court against the Slav national m inori­
ties joining their forces and  expecting support against the Slav national 
movements. The H ungarian gentry  thought th a t the coalition of the 
Slavs under the supposed leadership of Tsarist Russia necessitated the 
alliance of the dynasty  and  the H ungarians, for the m ovem ent of the 
Slavs equally endangers Austria as well as Hungary. In connection with 
the Slav th rea t, even berene Deak sta ted  th a t Hungarv would protect 
Austria against the “Slav confederation” being formed under Russian 
leadership. He was also the person who said th a t the repproaclim ent of the 
H ungarian nation to  the dynasty  was a positive consequence of Pan- 
Slavism. for the H ungarians and the  Court could resist only jo in tly  the 
menace th a t unfolds by the strengthening of the Slav m ovem ents.27
Kossuth himself had warned Vienna th a t it was in the interest of the 
Court to  safeguard the unity  of H ungary and to establish an alliance with 
the Hungarian nation. “Now the strength  of the Governm ent -  wrote 
Kossuth -  lays in winning over of the various nationalities living in its 
Em pire and  particularly , in the close contact with th a t one which does 
not feel any  sym pathy and which moreover, is quite averse to  a certain 
foreign power: th is being the H ungarian na tionality .” Kossuth in this 
article dedicated to  the propagation of H ungarian language, had also
* T h e  o p p o s itio n is t g ro u p  o f  c e n tra l is ts  fancied  th e  b ourgeo is t r a n s m u ta t io n s  in 
H u n g a ry  s tif f ly , d o c tr in a ire ly  a p p ly in g  to  i t  m ech an ica lly  th e  W es te rn  in te rp re ta tio n  o f 
soci d d ev e lo p m en t. An a t t i tu d e  o f  ind iffe rence  to  th e  r a th e r  im p o r ta n t  q u estio n  o f  n a ­
tio n a l in d ep en d en ce  w as show n  b y  th is  g ro u p .
,, \
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made the remark following in relation to Illyriism and Pan-Slavism: 
“And we would like to tear open our bosom to expose all the folds of our 
heart, so that all should see that it is no coward pretension, but a live 
conviction, when we would cry aloud and cry a thousand times that the 
Hungarians deserve trust, because the Hungarians are aware that their 
existence is linked to the glory of the Austrian dynasty.’’28
It is worth mentioning that the conservative judge of a County 
Court, Lajos Baloghy, a landlord in Nogrâd County, who similarly to 
Széchenyi represented a tolerant view in the question of nationalities, 
agreed a t this point with the Opposition, though he expressed his opinion 
against the Opposition when he dealt with the Magyarization of the 
Slavs in the country. Thus lie protested against the view, popular at a 
time, that Magyarization was required for defence against Tsarist Russia: 
“Therefore, I do not see a protective wall against the North in this, lor 
neither language, nor physical force can be victorious in the political 
tactics of today; I rather trust the wise Austrian Government, which 
plays a significant role in European politics and defends the throne and, 
by it also the Hungarians and which released us from the Turkish yoke of 
] 50 years; it can be hoped that by its force and that of its allies would not 
allow the Northern giant to enter through the Carpathians."2U
But the cooperation of the Austrian Court and the Hungarian Oppo­
sition had to face basic obstacles. The struggle of the Hungarian liberal 
nobility for the independence of Hungary and for bourgeois transforma­
tion had pushed into the background the orientation towards Austria 
which in the same time was directed against the Slav movements. And the 
Austrian Court, corresponding to its policy towards the nationalities, 
primarily supported the weaker national minorities of the country against 
the strongest one, i.e. the Hungarian. It should be noted, however, that 
this policy could not be applied long as the movement of the Slavs was 
gaining impetus, and consequently, it turned into its opposite in 1867 the 
Austrian Court concluded an alliance with the strongest nationality 
of Hungary against the other nationalities forging ahead. But the germs 
of the policy were present in the forties in the joint Austro-Hungarian 
measures slowing down and hindering Slav unity and represented the 
early antecedents of the compromise of 1867.
The fear of the Opposition from the Slavs was not by incidence critici­
zed by the conservative elements, who primarily polemized with the 
Appeal of VVesselényi. There is no scope here to go through all the points 
that were discussed: we would like to refer to only one question, the most 
important one that was related to the menace of Tsarist Russia. The 
retired army officer and conservative Ferenc Kâllay, member of the Hun­
garian Academy of Sciences, had challenged with remarkable arguments 
the imminent danger of the unity of the Slavs. Among the arguments, 
there were the difference of the various Slav languages, the religious 
differences among the Slavs, and their divergent views.30 “Moreover -  
wrote Kâllay — the loyalty of the Slav inhabitants towards the Austrian 
and Prussian courts has not yet sunk so low that one or two emissaries
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or a handful of paid agitators could set to  flam es the  provinces of Posen, 
the  Czech and  H ungarian, etc. lands. As regards H ungary, the  Croatians 
are all Catholics and  their landlords are in some ways related  to  us; con­
sequently , their religion and relationship are sufficient guarantees th a t 
the  municipal rights hallowed by m any centuries would not be easily 
sacrificed by them  for the sake of a p h a n ta sm . . . ”31
Contradictions are of many aspects in the liberal and conservative 
national ideology. The Opposition was optim istic about the  H ungarian 
nation  gaining ground and  about the success of M agyarization and  were 
pessimistic about the assessment of the policy o f Tsarist Russia suppor­
ting the Slavs, and a sharp  opposition against the  Habsburge was expres­
sed parallel to  an orientation tow ards the A ustrians. On th e  other side 
stands the tolerance of the conservatives and  their national demagogy. 
I t  is hoped, however, th a t the eonceptional roots of these contradictional 
phenom ena could be brought to  light by the present analysis.
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